Approaches to decision-making under uncertainty in the belief function framework are reviewed. Most methods are shown to blend criteria for decision under ignorance with the maximum expected utility principle of Bayesian decision theory. A distinction is made between methods that construct a complete preference relation among acts, and those that allow incomparability of some acts due to lack of information. Methods developed in the imprecise probability framework are applicable in the Dempster-Shafer context and are also reviewed. Shafer's constructive decision theory, which substitutes the notion of goal for that of utility, is described and contrasted with other approaches. The paper ends by pointing out the need to carry out deeper investigation of fundamental issues related to decision-making with belief functions and to assess the descriptive, normative and prescriptive values of the different approaches.
Introduction
The idea of using completely monotone capacities, or belief functions, to model uncertainty dates back to Dempster's seminal work on statistical inference [6, 7, 8] . It was later elaborated by Shafer in his 1976 book [31, 35] , to become a full-fledged theory of uncertainty, now commonly referred to as Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory, evidence theory, or theory of belief functions [12] . In short, DS theory starts with the definition of a frame of discernment Ω containing all the possible values some variable X can take. One and only one element of Ω is the true value. Independent pieces by evidence about X are then represented by belief functions and combined using a suitable operator called Dempster's rule of combination.
Much of the appeal of this theory is due to the generality of the belief function framework. If Bel is additive, it is a probability measure, and the usual probabilistic formalism if recovered. If there is some subset A of Ω such that Bel(B) = 1 if B contains A and Bel(B) = 0 otherwise, then belief function Bel represents a state of knowledge in which we know for sure that the truth is in A, and nothing else. In particular, the case A = Ω corresponds to complete ignorance or lack of evidence. Belief functions thus allow us to represent logical information, probabilistic information, or any combination of both. In that sense, belief functions can be seen both as generalized sets [13] , and as generalized probability measures. Whereas Shafer's book presented in great detail the mathematics of belief functions in the finite setting as well as mechanisms for combining belief functions, possibly expressed in different frames, it remained silent on the important issue of decision-making. Shafer wrote a paper on this topic in the early 1980's [35] , but this paper remained unpublished until recently [34] . In the last 40 years, many researchers have attempted to fill this vacuum and propose methods for making decisions when uncertainty is described by belief functions. The objective of this review paper is to provide a broad picture of these endeavors in view of clarifying the main issues and indicating directions for further research.
As belief functions make it possible to represent both ignorance and probabilistic information, most approaches to decision-making using belief functions extend classical methods for making decision under ignorance or probabilistic uncertainty. We will thus start with a brief reminder of these classical methods in Section 2, after which the belief function framework will be recalled in Section 3. We will then proceed with a systematic exposition of decision methods in the belief function framework. Criteria for decision-making with belief functions directly extending the classical criteria will first be reviewed in Section 4, and approaches based on the imprecise-probability view of belief functions will be described in Section 5. Shafer's "constructive" decision theory [34] , in which the concept of "goal" replaces that of "utility" will be exposed in Section 6. Finally, the different approaches will be summarized and discussed in Section 7.
Classical Decision Theories
In this section, we will first introduce the formal setting as well as the main notations and definitions in Section 2.1. The two classical frameworks of decision under ignorance and decision under probabilistic uncertainty will then be recalled, respectively, in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Definitions and Notations
A decision problem can be seen as a situation in which a decision-maker (DM) has to choose a course of action (or act) in some set F = {f 1 , . . . , f n }. An act may have different consequences, depending on the state of nature. Denoting by Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω s } the set of states of nature and by C = {c 1 , . . . , c r } the set 35 20 23 If the true state of nature ω were known, then the desirability of an act f could be deduced from that of its consequence f (ω). Typically, however, the state of nature is unknown. A decision problem is then described by (1) the payoff matrix U and (2) some description of the uncertainty about the state of nature. The outcome of the decision problem is typically a preference relation among acts. This relation is interpreted as follows: given two acts f and f , f f means that f is found by the DM to be at least as desirable as f . We also define the strict preference relation as f f iff f f and ¬(f f ) (meaning that f is strictly more desirable than f ) and an indifference relation f ∼ f iff f f and f f (meaning that f and f are equally desirable). The preference relation is generally assumed to be reflexive (for any f , f f ) and transitive (for any f, f , f , if f f and f f , then f f ): it is then a preorder. If, additionally, the relation is antisymmetric (for any f, f , if f f and f f , then f = f ), then it is an order. This preference relation is complete if, for any two acts f and f , f f or f f . Otherwise, it is partial. An act f is a greatest element of relation if it is at least as desirable as any other act, i.e, if, for any f ∈ F, f f . A complete preorder always has at least one greatest element, and it has only one if it is a complete order. An act f is a maximal (or non-dominated) element of the strict preference relation if no other act is strictly preferred to f , i.e., if for any f ∈ F, ¬(f f ). A greatest element is a maximal element, but the converse is false in general.
Most decision methods provide a complete or partial preorder of the set F of acts. We can then compute the set of greatest elements in the former case, and the set of maximal elements in the latter. Some methods do not give us a preference relation, but directly a choice set, defined as subset F * ⊆ F composed of "most preferred" acts. We can then reconstruct a partial preference relation such that all elements in F * are greatest elements as follows:
∀f, f ∈ F * , f ∼ f ∀f ∈ F * , ∀f ∈ F * , f f .
Decision under Ignorance
Let us start with the situation where the DM is totally ignorant of the state of nature. All the information given to the DM is thus the utility matrix U . A act f i is said to be dominated by f k if the consequences of act f k are always at least as desirable as those of act f i , whatever the state of nature, and strictly more desirable in at least one state, i.e., if u ij ≤ u kj for all j, and u ij < u kj for some j. According to the non-domination principle [44] , an act that is dominated by another one should never be chosen and can, therefore, be discarded. For instance, in Table 1 , we can see that act f 5 is dominated by f 1 : consequently, we can remove f 5 from further consideration. After all dominated acts have been removed, there remains the problem of ordering the non-dominated acts by desirability, and finding the set of most desirable acts. In the following, we first recall some classical decision methods in this setting, as well as a more recent generalization. We then discuss some axiomatic arguments proposed by Arrow and Hurwicz [2] .
Classical Criteria
Several criteria of "rational choice" that have been proposed to derive a complete preference relation over acts. They are summarized in the following list (see, e.g., [27, 44] ):
• The maximax criterion considers, for each act, its more favorable consequence. We then have
• Conversely, Wald's maximin criterion [51] takes into account the least favorable consequence of each act: act f i is thus at least as desirable as
• The Hurwicz criterion [21] considers, for each act, a convex combination of the minimum and maximum utility:
where α is a parameter in [0, 1] called the pessimism index.
• The Laplace criterion ranks acts according to the average utility of their consequences:
• Finally, the minimax regret criterion [28] considers an act f i to be at least as desirable as f k if it has smaller maximal regret, where regret is defined as the utility difference with the best act, for a given state of nature. More precisely, let the regret r ij for act f i and state ω j be defined as follows,
The maximum regret for act f i is R i = max j r ij , and act f i is considered to be at least as desirable as f k when R i ≤ R k .
Example 2 Consider the payoff matrix of Example 1. We have seen that act f 5 is dominated and should be ruled out. From the calculations shown in Tables  2 and 3 , we can see that the above five criteria yield different strict preference relations:
• Hurwicz with α = 0.5:
The maximax and maximin criteria correspond, respectively, to extreme optimistic and pessimistic (or conservative) attitudes of the DM. The Hurwicz criterion allows us to parameterize the DM's attitude toward ambiguity, using the pessimism index. Figure 1(a) shows the aggregated utilities as functions of the pessimism index. The Laplace criterion can be seen as an application of the expected utility principle (see Section 2.3 below), using a uniform probability distribution over the state of nature as an application of Laplace's principle of indifference. These four criteria amount to extending the utility function to sets, i.e., they aggregate, for each act f i , the utilities u ij for all j, into a single number. The minimax regret criterion works differently, as it measures the desirability of an act by a quantity that depends on the consequences of all other acts.
Ordered Weighted Average Criterion
The Laplace, maximax, maximin and Hurwicz criteria correspond to different ways of aggregating utilities using, respectively, the average, the maximum, the minimum, and a convex sum of the minimum and the maximum. These four operators happen to belong to the family of so-called Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) operators [58] . An OWA operator of arity s is a function F : R s → R of the form
where x (i) is the i-th largest element in the collection x 1 , . . . , x s , and w 1 , . . . , w s are positive weights that sum to 1. It is clear that the four above-mentioned operators are obtained for different choices of the weights:
Average: (1/s, 1/s, . . . , 1/s);
Maximum: (1, 0, . . . , 0); Table 4 : Aggregated utilities using the OWA aggregation operator with β = 0.2 and β = 0.7 and the payoff matrix of Example 1. Minimum: (0, . . . , 0, 1);
In a decision-making context, each weight w i may be interpreted as a probability that the i-th best outcome will happen. Yager [58] defines the degree of optimism of an OWA operator with weight vector w as
The degree of optimism equals 1 for the maximum, 0 for the minimum, 0.5 for the mean, and 1 − α for the Hurwicz criterion. Given a degree of optimism β, Yager [58] proposes to choose the OWA operator F β that maximizes the entropy
under the constraint OP T (w) = β.
Example 3 Consider again the data of Example 1. With β = 0.2 and β = 0.7, we get, respectively, w = (0.0819, 0.236, 0.682) and w = (0.554, 0.292, 0.154). The aggregating utilities for these two cases are shown in Table 4 , and the corresponding preference relations are: 
Axiomatic Arguments
The fact that different criteria yield different (and, sometimes, even opposite) results is disturbing and it calls for axiomatic arguments to support the choice of a criterion. Given a set of acts F, each of the above five criteria induces a complete preorder and a choice set F * containing the greatest elements of . Arrow and Hurwicz [2] have proposed four axioms that a choice operator F → F * (i.e., a way of constructing the choice set) should verify. The following description of these axioms is taken from [16] .
Axiom A 1 : The non-empty intersection of a decision problem (set of acts) and the choice set of a larger decision problem is the choice set of the former.
Axiom A 2 : Relabeling actions and states does not change the optimal status of actions. Formally, if φ a is a one-to-one mapping from F 1 to F 2 and φ s is a one-to-one mapping from Ω 1 to Ω 2 such that, for all f ∈ F 1 and for
Given a set of acts F, a state ω ∈ Ω is said to be duplicate if there exists another state ω in Ω such that, for all f ∈ F, f (ω) = f (ω ). Deleting a duplicate state ω means defining a new state space Ω = Ω\{ω} and the new set of actions F| Ω containing the restrictions f | Ω of all acts f in F. We then have the following postulate.
Axiom A 3 : Deletion of a duplicate state does not change the optimality status of actions. Formally,
Axiom A 1 is clearly violated by the minimax regret criterion. To see this, consider again, for instance, the decision problem of Example 1. For F 1 = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 }, we have seen that F * 1 = {f 2 } according to the minimax regret criterion. Now, consider a new act f 6 such that u 61 = 0, u 62 = 100 and u 63 = 0, and F 2 = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 , f 6 }. As a consequence of the introduction of this new act, the maximal regrets of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 and f 6 now become, respectively, 75, 30, 45, 27 and 49. Hence, F * 2 = {f 4 } and F * 1 = F * 2 ∩ F 1 . Act f 4 , which was initially considered strictly less desirable than f 2 , becomes strictly more desirable after an additional act f 6 is considered.
It is also easy to see that Axiom A 3 is violated by the Laplace criterion. To illustrate this point, assume that, in Example 1, we split the state of nature ω 1 in two states: "Economic scenario 1 occurs and there is life on Mars" (ω 1 ) and "Economic scenario 1 occurs and there is no life on Mars" (ω 1 ). It is clear that the payoffs of the real estate investments are identical under ω 1 and ω 1 . Consequently, the new payoff matrix will be obtained by duplicating the first column in Table 1 . With this payoff matrix, the average utilities for the four acts are 30.5, 42.5, 26.25 and 36.25. Consequently, the choice set for the Laplace criterion is F * = {f 2 }. Should we learn that there is no life of Mars, we would delete ω 1 and get that same payoff matrix as in Table 1 , resulting in choice set {f 4 }. Learning that there is no life on Mars thus made us change our investment decision! Consequently, convincing arguments can be put forward for rejecting the Laplace and minimax regret criteria as criteria for rational decision-making under ignorance. A stronger result, due to Arrow and Hurwicz [2] is that, under some regularity assumptions, Axioms A 1 to A 4 imply that the choice set depends only on the worst and the best consequences of each act. This result provides a strong argument in favor of the Hurwicz criterion (3).
Decision under Probabilistic Uncertainty
Let us now consider the situation where uncertainty about the state of nature is quantified by probabilities p 1 , . . . , p s on Ω. Typically, these probabilities are assumed to be objective: we say that we have a problem of decision under risk. However, the following developments also apply to the case where the probabilities are subjective. In any case, the probability distribution p 1 , . . . , p s is assumed to be known, together with the utility matrix U . We can then compute, for each act f i , its expected utility as
According to the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) principle, an act f i is more desirable than an act f k if its yields more desirable consequences on average over all possible states of nature, i.e., if it has a higher expected utility:
The MEU principle was first axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern [48] . We give hereafter a summary of their argument. Given a probability distribution on Ω, an act f : Ω → C induces a probability measure P on the set C of consequences (assumed to be finite), called a lottery. We denote by L the set of lotteries on C. If we agree that two acts providing the same lottery are equivalent, then the problem of comparing the desirability of acts becomes that of comparing the desirability of lotteries. Let be a preference relation among lotteries. Von Neumann and Morgenstern argued that, to be rational, a preference relation should verify the following three axioms.
Complete preorder: the preference relation is a complete and non-trivial preorder (i.e., it is a reflexive, transitive and complete relation) on L.
Continuity: for any lotteries P , Q and R such that P Q R, there exist probabilities α and β in [0, 1] such that
where αP + (1 − α)R is a compound lottery, which refers to the situation where you receive P with probability α and Q with probability 1 − α. This axiom means that (1) no lottery R is so undesirable that it cannot become desirable if mixed with some very desirable lottery P , and (2) that, conversely, no act P is so desirable that it cannot become undesirable if mixed with some very undesirable lottery R.
Independence: for any lotteries P , Q and R and for any α ∈ (0, 1],
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Von Neumann and Morgentern)
The two following propositions are equivalent:
1. The preference relation verifies the axioms of complete preorder, continuity, and independence;
2. There exists a utility function u : C → R such that, for any two lotteries P = (p 1 , . . . , p r ) and Q = (q 1 , . . . , q r ),
Function u is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem has had a tremendous impact, as it provides a compelling justification of both the notion of utility, and the MEU principle. For problems of decision under risk, the normative value of the MEU principle is widely accepted. From a descriptive point of view, violations of the MEU principle by most DMs in some particular situations have been demonstrated experimentally by Allais [1] , among others. For problems of decision under uncertainty (in which probabilities are not given in advance), Savage [29] has argued, based on rationality requirements, that a DM should always maximize expected utility, for some subjective probability measure and utility function. However, the relevance of Savage's axioms has been questioned (see, e.g., [33] ). Moreover, it can be shown experimentally that, in the presence of ambiguity, people tend to make decisions in a way that is not consistent with the "sure thing principle", one of Savage's axioms [14] .
Theory of Belief Functions
Before reviewing decision methods in the belief function framework in the following sections, we will first recall the main definitions and results pertaining to belief functions in Section 3.1. The motivation for considering decision problems in this framework will then be exposed in Section 3.2. Such a function arises when we compare the evidence to the situation in which we receive a coded message [32] , and we know that the code has been selected at random from a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s q } with known probabilities p 1 , . . . , p q . If code s i was selected, then the meaning of the message is X ∈ Γ(s i ), where Γ is a multi-valued mapping from S to 2 Ω . In this setting,
Belief Functions
is the probability that the meaning of the code is X ∈ A, i.e., the probability of knowing only that X ∈ A, and nothing more. Given a mass function m, belief and plausibility functions can be defined, respectively, as
and
where A denotes the complement of A. The quantities Bel(A) and P l(A) denote, respectively, the probability that the evidence implies the proposition X ∈ A, and the probability that the evidence does not contradict this proposition. Mathematically, a belief function is a completely monotone capacity, i.e., it verifies Bel(∅) = 0, Bel(Ω) = 1 and, for any k ≥ 2 and for any family
Conversely, any completely monotone capacity Bel corresponds a unique mass function m such that
Relationship with probabilistic and set-theoretic formalisms When the focal sets of m are singletons, functions Bel and P l boil down to a single probability measure. Mass function m is then said to be Bayesian. DempsterShafer theory is, thus, strictly more expressive than probability theory, which is recovered as a special case when the available information is uncertain, but precise. When there is only one focal set A, then Bel(B) = I(A ⊆ B), where I(·) is the indicator function. Such a belief function is said to be logical. It describes to a piece of evidence that tell us that X ∈ A for sure, and nothing more: it thus describes certain, but imprecise information. There is a one-to-one correspondence between subsets and Ω and logical belief functions. A general belief function (or, equivalently, its associated mass function) can, thus, be seen as a generalized set [13] .
Imprecise-probability view Given a belief function Bel induced by a mass function m, we can consider the set P(m) of probability measures P that dominate it, i.e., such that P (A) ≥ Bel(A) for all A ⊆ Ω. Any such probability measure is said to be compatible with Bel, and P(m) is called the credal set of m. It is clear that this set is convex. An arbitrary element of P(m) can be obtained by distributing each mass m(A) among the elements of A. More precisely, let us call an allocation of m any function
such that, for all A ⊆ Ω,
Each quantity a(ω, A) can be viewed as a part of m(A) allocated to the element ω of A. By summing up the numbers a(ω, A) for each ω, we get a probability mass function on Ω,
It can be shown [6] that the set of probability measures constructed in that way is exactly equal to the credal set P(m). Furthermore, the following equalities hold for any A ⊆ Ω:
A belief function is, thus, a coherent lower probability. However, not all coherent lower probabilities are belief functions [53] .
Necessity of a Theory of Decision-Making with Belief Functions
As shown in the previous section, the formalism of belief functions, having more degrees of freedom than probability theory, allows for the representation of weaker forms of information, up to total ignorance. Belief functions thus appear in decision problems when information is weaker than generally assumed in the probabilistic framework. In particular, two non exclusive situations are typically encountered. The first situation is one in which the DM's information concerning the possible states of nature is best described by a belief function m on Ω. This is the case, for instance, in classification problem, when a classifier quantifies the uncertainty about the class of an object by a belief function, and a decision regarding the assignment of that object has to be made [10] . Any act f then carries m to the set C of consequences. The mass assigned to each focal set A of m is transferred to f (A). The resulting mass function 1 µ f on C, called an evidential lottery, is then defined by
for any B ⊆ C. The second situation in which belief functions come into the picture is that in which the consequences of each act under each state of nature may not be precisely described. As discussed in [15] , this situation may arise when the decision problem is underspecified: for instance, the set of acts F or the state space Ω may be too coarsely defined. In that case, an act may formally be represented by a multi-valued mapping f : Ω → 2 C , assigning a set of possible consequences f (ω) ⊆ C to each state of nature ω. Given a probability distribution p : Ω → [0, 1], f then induces the following mass function µ f on C,
for all B ⊆ C. It is clear that these two situations can occur simultaneously, i.e., we may have a mass function m on Ω, and ill-known consequences. In that case, Equations (16) and (17) become
for all B ⊆ C.
Example 4
Let Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 } and m the following mass function on Ω:
Let C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } and f the act
To compute the induced mass function on C, we transfer the masses as follows:
Finally, we obtain the following mass function on C:
In any of the situations considered above, we can assign to each act f an evidential lottery µ f on C. Determining preferences among acts then amounts to determining preferences among evidential lotteries. Several methods generalizing the decision criteria reviewed in Section 2 will first be reviewed in Section 4. Decision methods based on the imprecise-probability view of belief functions will then be presented in Section 5.
Extensions of Classical Criteria
As recalled in Section 3.1, belief functions can be seen both as generalized sets and as generalized probabilities. As a consequence, criteria for decision-making with belief functions can be constructed by blending the criteria for decision under ignorance reviewed in Section 2.2 with the MEU principle recalled in Section 2.3. These criteria will be examined in Sections 4.1 to 4.5, and axiomatic arguments will be discussed in Section 4.6. Finally, partial preference relations among evidential lotteries will be discussed in Section 4.7.
Upper and Lower Expected Utilities
Let µ be a mass function on C, and u a utility function C → R. The lower and upper expectations of u with respect to µ are defined, respectively, as the averages of the minima and the maxima of u within each focal set of µ [6, 32, 9] :
It is clear that E µ (u) ≤ E µ (u), with the inequality becoming an equality when µ is Bayesian, in which case the lower and upper expectations collapse to the usual expectation. If µ is logical with focal set A, then E µ (u) and E µ (u) are, respectively, the minimum and the maximum of u in A. As shown [18] , the lower and upper expectations are Choquet integrals [4] with respect to the belief and plausibility functions, respectively. Based on the notions of lower and upper expectations, we can define two complete preference relations among evidential lotteries as
Relation * corresponds to a pessimistic (or conservative) attitude of the DM, since it takes in account the least favorable consequence within each focal set. When µ is logical, * corresponds to the maximin criterion. Symmetrically, * corresponds to an optimistic attitude and extends the maximax criterion. For this reason, the strategies of maximizing the lower and upper expected utilities can be referred to as (generalized) maximin and (generalized) maximax, respectively. Both criteria boil down to the EU criterion when µ is Bayesian.
Example 5 Consider again the investment example, with the utility matrix shown in Table 2 . Assume that uncertainty about the state of nature Ω is described by the following mass function: Table 5 : Aggregated utilities using the OWA aggregation operator with β = 0.2 and β = 0.7 and the payoff matrix of Example 1. Consider, for instance, act f 1 . It induces the following evidential lottery: The lower and upper expected expectations for the fours acts are shown in Table  5 . The corresponding strict preference relations among acts are
Generalized Hurwicz Criterion
Just as the lower and upper expected utility models generalize, respectively, the maximin and maximax criteria, the Hurwicz criterion (3) can be readily generalized by defining the expectation of u, for a pessimism index α ∈ [0, 1], as
A more general version of this criterion (where α in (26a) depends on A) was first introduced by Jaffray [22, 23] , who also justified it axiomatically (see Section 4.6 below). Criterion (26) with fixed α was later discussed by Strat [43] , who proposed to interpret α as the DM's subjective probability that the ambiguity will be resolved unfavorably (see also [42] for a discussion of this criterion). Hereafter, we will use the term "Hurwicz criterion" to refer to decision based on (26) , as this principle is a direct extension to the Hurwicz criterion in the case of complete ignorance.
Pignistic Criterion
A completely different approach to decision-making with belief function was advocated by Smets as part of the Transferable Belief Model, a variant of Dempster-Shafer theory [37, 40, 38] . Smets defended a two-level mental model, composed of a credal level, where an agent's belief are represented by belief functions, and the pignistic level, where decisions are made by maximizing EU with respect to a probability measure derived from a belief function. The rationale for introducing probabilities at the decision level is the avoidance of Dutch books, i.e., sequences of bets than incur sure loss [47] . Furthermore, Smets [39] argued that, as the consequence of the MEU principle, the belief-probability transformation T should be linear, i.e., it should verify
for any mass functions µ 1 and µ 2 and for any α ∈ [0, 1]. He then showed that the only transformation T verifying (27) is the pignistic transformation, with p µ = T (µ) given by
for any c ∈ C. The pignistic probability p µ turns out to be mathematically identical to the Shapley value in cooperative game theory [36] . The expected utility w.r.t. the pignistic probability is
The maximum pignistic expected utility criterion thus averages the mean utility inside each focal set A. Consequently, it extends the Laplace criterion discussed in Section 2.2, when uncertainty is quantified by a belief function. Similarly, we find E p2 (u) = 43.8, E p3 (u) = 21.8 and E p4 (u) = 33.4.
Remark 1
We have seen in Section 2.2 that the Laplace criterion for decisionmaking under ignorance may lead to different decisions when a state of nature is "duplicated", i.e., when the state space Ω is refined. The pignistic criterion obviously has the same drawback: refining the frame of discernment changes the pignistic probability. Smets [40] tried to circumvent this difficulty by stating that the DM needs to select a "betting frame" before computing the pignistic probability. It is not always clear, however, on which basis such a choice can be made.
Wilson [55] showed that the lower and upper expectations (23) are, respectively, the minimum and the maximum of the pignistic expectations computed over all refinements of the frame of discernment.
Remark 2 There are obviously other ways of transforming a belief function into a probability distribution. Voorbraak [49] and Cobb and Shenoy [5] have argued for the plausibility transformation, which approximates a belief function by a probability distribution, in such a way that the probability of singletons is proportional to their plausibility. This transformation has the remarkable property of being compatible with Dempster's rule (i.e., the approximation of the orthogonal sum of two belief functions is the orthogonal sum of their approximations). This property makes the plausibility transformation suitable for approximating a DS model by a probabilistic model. To our knowledge, no argument has been put forward in favor of using this approximating probability distribution for decision-making.
Generalized OWA Criterion
A more general family of expected utility criteria can be defined by aggregating the utilities u(c) within each focal set A ⊆ C using OWA operators as recalled in Section 2.2 [59] . It is clear that the previous definitions in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are recovered as special cases. To determine the weights of the OWA operators, Yager [59] proposed to fix the degree of optimism β defined by (7) , and to use the maximum-entropy operators, for each cardinality |A|. Formally,
where F |A|,β is the maximum-entropy OWA operator with degree of optimism β and arity |A|. We can remark that parameter β plays the same role here, and has roughly the same interpretation, as one minus the pessimism index α in the Hurwicz criterion. However, each quantity F |A|,β ({u(c)|c ∈ A}) depends on all the values u(c) for all c ∈ A, and not only on the minimum and the maximum, and the pignistic criterion is recovered for β = 0.5. This method is further discussed in Ref. [56] .
Example 7 Considering again the investment example and the mass function of Examples 5 and 6, Figure 2 shows the aggregated utilities for the Hurwicz criteria as functions of α (Figure 2(a) ) and for the generalized OWA criterion as functions of 1−β (Figure 2(b) ). Once again, we can see that this two criteria yield similar results, and that the pignistic expectations are obtained as a special case of the generalized OWA criterion with β = 0.5. 
Generalized Minimax Regret
Finally, Yager [60] also extended the minimax regret criterion to belief functions. As in Section 2.2, we need to consider n acts f 1 , . . . , f n , and we write u ij = u[f i (ω j )]. The regret if act f i is selected, and state ω j occurs, is r ij = max k u kj − u ij . For a non-empty subset A of Ω, the maximum regret of act f i is
Given a mass function m on Ω, the expected maximal regret for act f i is
Using the generalized minimax regret criterion, act f i is preferred over act f k if R i ≤ R k . The minimax regret criterion of decision-making under ignorance is recovered when m is logical. If m is Bayesian, we have
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (33c) does not depend on i, and the second one is the expected utility. Hence, the generalized minimax regret criterion is identical to the MEU model when m is Bayesian.
Example 8
The regrets r ij for the investment data are given in Table 3 . With the mass function of Example 5, we get, for act f 1 :
Similarly, we have R 2 = 15.3, R 3 = 42.9 and R 4 = 24.3. The corresponding preference relation is, thus, f 2 f 4 f 1 f 3 .
Axiomatic Arguments
Except for generalized minimax regret, the criteria for decision-making with belief functions decision reviewed above are all of the form
where U is a function from the set of evidential lotteries to R, such that
where µ A is the logical mass function with focal set A. To simplify the notation, we can write U (A) in place of U (µ A ), and u(c) for U ({c}). With these notations, we have
• U (A) = min c∈A u(c) for the maxmin criterion;
• U (A) = max c∈A u(c) for the maximax criterion;
• U (A) = α min c∈A u(c) + (1 − α) max c∈A u(c) for the Hurwicz criterion;
• U (A) = (1/|A|) c∈A u(c) for the pignistic criterion;
• U (A) = F |A|,β ({u(c)|c ∈ A}) for the OWA criterion.
Jaffray [23] showed that a preference relation among evidential lotteries is representable by a linear utility function verifying (35) if and only if it verifies the Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms (see Section 2.3) extended to evidential lotteries, i.e.,
Transitivity and Completeness:
is a transitive and complete relation (i.e., a complete preorder);
Continuity: for all µ 1 , µ 2 and µ 3 such that µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 , there exists α, β in (0, 1) such that
Independence: for all µ 1 , µ 2 and µ 3 , and for all α in (0, 1), µ 1 µ 2 implies
It is clear that U (µ) in (35) becomes the expected utility when µ is Bayesian: we then have
The major difference with the classical EU model is that we now need, in the general case, to elicit the utility values U (A) for each subset A ⊆ C of consequences, which limits the practical use of the method. However, Jaffray [23] showed that a major simplification of (35) can be achieved by introducing an additional axiom. To present this axiom, let us introduce the following notation. Let us write c 1 c 2 whenever µ {c1} µ {c2} . Furthermore, let c A and c A denote, respectively, the worst and the best consequence in A. The additional axiom can then be stated as follows:
Dominance: for all non-empty subsets A and B of C, if c A c B and c A c B ,
This axiom was justified by Jaffray [23] as follows. If c A c B and c A c B , it is possible to construct a set Ω of states of nature, and two acts f : Ω → A and f : Ω → B, such that, for any ω ∈ Ω, f (ω) f (ω). As act f dominates f , it should be preferred whatever the information on Ω. Hence, f should be preferred to f when we have a vacuous mass function on Ω, in which case f and f induce, respectively, the logical mass function µ A and µ B on C.
The Dominance axiom immediately implies that, for any non-empty subsets A and B of C, if c A ∼ c B and c A ∼ c B , then µ A ∼ µ B , and U (A) = U (B). Hence, U (A) depends only on the worst and the least consequence in A, and we can write U (A) = u(c A , c A ). Equation (35) thus becomes
If one accepts the Dominance axiom, one is the led to rejecting the pignistic criterion, as well as the generalized OWA criterion, except when it is identical to the Hurwicz criterion.
To describe the DM's attitude to ambiguity, Jaffray [23] then introduced the local pessimism index α(c, c), defined as the value of α which makes the DM indifferent between:
1. Receiving at least c and at most c, with no further information, and 2. Receiving either c with probability α or c with probability 1 − α. 
This relation shows how the DM's attitudes to risk and to ambiguity jointly determine U . Now, the utility of evidential lottery µ can be written as
The Hurwicz criterion (26) corresponds to the case where α(c, c) is equal to a constant α. Jaffray's axioms are the counterpart of the axioms of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (see Section 2.3) for decision under risk: assuming uncertainty about the consequences of each act to be described by belief functions, they justify the decision strategy maximizing the utility criterion (41) for evidential lotteries.
Remark 3 Until now, there is no decision-theoretic justification of belief functions similar to Savage's axioms for probabilities. There are, however, two remarkable results that justify the use of belief functions for decision-making. Interestingly, both results also justify Jaffray's decision criterion (41) . The first of these results is due to Jaffray and Wakker [24] (see also [50] ), who consider the situation where objective probabilities are defined on a finite set S, and there is a multi-valued mapping Γ that maps each element s ∈ S to a subset Γ(s) of the set Ω of states of nature. The authors thus do not postulate a belief function in the first place, but start one step before, i.e., they postulate the existence of a source, which induces a belief function Bel (see Section 3.1). Each act f : Ω → C then carries Bel from Ω to C, i.e., it induces an evidential lottery. The authors then justify a neutrality axiom, which states that two acts are indifferent whenever they generate the same evidential lottery. Finally, they derive the decision criterion (41) from two axioms: a continuity condition, and a weakened version of Savage's sure-thing principle. Interestingly, a similar criterion was obtained in [15] , for the case where an act is defined as a multi-valued mapping from Ω to 2 C . By postulating axioms similar to those of Savage, and two additional axioms, Ghirardato proved that the preference relation among acts is represented by a utility function similar to (41) . [17] have proposed an alternative set of axioms, leading to a different decision criterion (see also [16] ). Their approach, however, is restricted to the case of partially consonant mass functions. A mass function m is said to be partially consonant if its focal sets can be divided into groups such that (a) the focal sets of different groups do not intersect and (b) the focal sets of the same group are nested. The family of partially consonant mass functions includes Bayesian and consonant mass functions as special cases. In the context of statistical inference, Walley [52] has shown that partially consonant mass functions arise as a consequence of some axioms. There does not seem, however, to be any compelling reason for constraining belief functions to be partially consonant outside the specific context of statistical inference.
Remark 4 Giang and Shenoy

Dropping the Completeness Requirement
If one drops the requirement that the preference relation among evidential lotteries be complete, then one can adopt the following partial preference relation, called the strong dominance or interval dominance relation [45] :
Given a collection of evidential lotteries µ 1 , . . . , µ n , we can then consider the set of non-dominated elements with respect to the strict preference relation SD . The choice set is then
However, condition (42) is very strong, and many pairs of mass functions will typically not be comparable. As a consequence, choice set (43) will often be too large. Additionally, the strong dominance relation (42) seems hard to justify outside the imprecise-probability setting (see Section 5) . A weaker partial preference relation, which does not seem to have been mentioned in the literature, is the weak dominance relation defined as follows:
Obviously, µ 1 SD µ 2 implies µ 1 W D µ 2 , so that relation W D compares more pairs of mass functions than SD does. Further, weak dominance can be justified as follows: µ 1 is at least as desirable as µ 2 according to weak dominance iff it is at least as desirable as µ 2 according to the Hurwicz criterion for any value of the pessimism index α. Formally,
where E µ1,α (u) and E µ2,α (u) are defined by Eq. (26) . Weak dominance thus implements a conservative approach that seems appropriate if one accepts the Hurwicz criterion while being totally ignorant about the DM's attitude towards ambiguity.
Example 9
As we can see from Table 5 and Figure 2 , no pair of acts (f i , f j ) is such that E µi (u) ≥ E µj (u). Consequently, the choice set for the strong dominance relation is {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 }, i.e., the strong dominance criterion does not allow us to compare any of the four acts. For the weak dominance criterion, we can see that act f 2 dominates the other three acts, but is not dominated by any other act. Consequently, the choice set for the weak dominance relation is {f 2 }.
Imprecise-Probability View
As recalled in Section 3.1, a belief function is a coherent lower probability for a convex set of compatible probability measures. Consequently, decision criteria proposed in the imprecise-probability framework [45, 20] are also applicable when uncertainty is described by belief functions. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that we are in the case where we have a mass function m on Ω and acts are mappings from Ω to C. For each act f i , we denote by g i = u • f i the function that maps each ω j in Ω to the utility u ij = u[f i (ω j )]. Function g i from Ω to R is called a gamble. The lower and upper expectations defined by Eq.
(23) can be rewritten using (16) as follows:
with g = u • f . Similarly, E µ (u) can be written as E m (g). The mappings g → E m (g) and g → E m (g) are called, respectively, lower and upper previsions [53] . An important result is that these lower and upper expectations can be interpreted as lower and upper bounds of expectations with respect to compatible probability measures [32, 54, 18] . In other words, the mean of minima in (46d) is also the minimum of means (expectations) with respect to all compatible probability measures; similarly, the mean of maxima is the maximum of means [18] . Formally, we have the following equalities:
The interval E m (g), E m (g) can, thus, be seen as the range of E P (g) for all probability measures P in the credal set of m.
As a consequence of the above result, the strong dominance relation (42) has a natural interpretation in the imprecise-probability setting. Let g 1 and g 2 be two gambles. By abuse of notation, we can use the same symbol for the preference relations among gambles and among evidential lotteries. Thus,
i.e., iff for any two probability measures P 1 and P 2 compatible with m, the expectation of g 1 with respect to P 1 is always higher that the expectation of g 2 with respect to P 2 . Formally,
A gamble g is, thus, a maximal element of SD if, for any gamble g , there exists probability measures P and Q in P(m) such that E P (g) ≥ E Q (g ). This set is arguably too large, as P and Q are not required to be identical. Two more useful decision criteria developed in the imprecise-probability framework will now be discussed in Section 5.1 and 5.2.
Maximality
The maximality criterion was introduced by Walley [53, Section 3.9, page 160]. It states that gamble g 1 is at least as desirable as g 2 if the lower expectation of g 1 − g 2 is positive:
and the preference is strict if the inequality in the right-hand side of (49) is strict. In Walley's theory, a lower prevision is interpreted as the highest price an agent is willing to pay to acquire a gamble. Clearly, Eq. (49) expresses that the DM is willing to pay a positive price to get g 1 instead of g 2 , i.e., that he strictly prefers g 1 to g 2 . In terms of credal set, the condition E m (g 1 − g 2 ) ≥ 0 means that, for any compatible probability P , the expectation of g 1 − g 2 with respect to P is positive, i.e.:
Comparing Eqs (48) and (50), it is clear that g 1 SD g 2 ⇒ g 1 max g 2 , and the implication is strict. A gamble g is a maximal element of max iff, for any gamble g , there exists P ∈ P(m) such that E P (g) ≥ E P (g ). The set of maximal elements of max is, thus, included in that of SD . The maximality criterion thus seems to be better founded and more useful than strong dominance. However, these advantages come at a price, as finding the maximal elements according to the maximality criterion requires computing n 2 − n lower expectations (where n is the number of gambles), against n lower expectations and as many upper expectations for the strong dominance criterion [45] . Hence, strong dominance has a computational advantage when the number of alternatives is large. As the choice set of SD contains that of max , it can also be computed as a preliminary step to reduce the number operations needed to implement the maximality criterion.
Finally, we can remark that maximality, although introduced and studied in the imprecise-probability context, also makes sense regardless of any notion of imprecise probability. In the DS framework, Eq. (49) can be understood to mean that, if one DM selects g 1 and another DM selects g 2 , then the former is expected to gain a higher utility, even assuming that ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the latter.
Example 10 Consider again the pay-off matrix of Table 2 and the mass function m of Example 5. We have g 1 (ω 1 ) = 37, g 1 (ω 2 ) = 25, g 1 (ω 3 ) = 23 and g 2 (ω 1 ) = 49, g 2 (ω 2 ) = 70, g 3 (ω 3 ) = 2. Hence,
Consequently, g 1 and g 2 are not comparable by the maximality criterion. The matrix ∆g with general term We thus have g 2 max g 3 and g 2 max g 4 , whereas g 1 and g 2 are not dominated by any other gamble. Consequently, the choice set for the maximality criterion is {g 1 , g 2 }.
E-admissibility
As we have seen in the previous section, a gamble g belongs to the choice set according to the maximality criterion if it has a higher expected utility than any other gamble g for some probability P that may depend on g . The eadmissibility criterion [26, page 96] strengthens this condition by requiring the existence of a compatible probability P for which g has higher expected utility than any other gamble. Formally, g is in the choice set according to the eadmissibility criterion iff there exists P in P(m) such that, for any gamble g ,
This definition results in a choice set that is included in that of the maximality criterion. In [30] , Seidenfeld compared the maximin and eadmissibility criteria, and argued for the latter in sequential decision problems. We can remark that, in contrast with other decision criteria mentioned until now, e-admissibility defines a choice set directly, without explicitly defining a preference relation. We can, however, construct a preference relation from the choice set, as explained in Section 2.1. The meaning of the e-admissibility criterion seems to be more deeply rooted in the theory of imprecise probability than that of maximality. Moreover, it is much more costly to implement computationally: to determine whether a gamble is e-admissible, we need to solve a linear programming problem [46, 19] . In the case when uncertainty about the state of nature is described by a mass function m, this problem can be formulated using the allocation function (13) . Let F 1 , . . . , F q denote the focal sets of m (where q can be much smaller than 2 n ), a kj = a(ω k , F j ) for all (k, j) such that ω k ∈ F j , a a vector containing all the a kj 's, p the vector of probabilities p = (p 1 , . . . , p s ), and λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ i−1 , λ i+1 , . . . , λ n ) a vector of n − 1 slack variables. To determine whether gamble g i is e-admissible, we can solve the following problem: min λ,a,p l =i λ l subject to:
Eqs. (51a) and (51b) express that the a kj 's define an allocation function, and Eq. (51c) expresses that the p k are compatible probabilities. Eq. (51d) can be written as E P (g i ) + λ l ≥ E P (g l ), where P is the probability measure such that P ({ω k }) = p k for k = 1, . . . , s. By minimizing the sum of the λ l 's under constraints (51a)-(51e), we get the solution λ = 0 iff there exists P ∈ P(m) such that E P (g i ) ≥ E P (g l ) for all l, i.e., iff gamble g i is e-admissible. To determine the set of e-admissible gambles, we can start with the choice set of the maximality criterion, and solve the linear program above for each element in that set.
Example 11
In Example 10, we found that g 1 and g 2 are in the choice set of the maximality criterion. Let Consequently, gamble g 1 is e-admissible. Using the same method, g 2 can be shown to be also e-admissible.
Shafer's Constructive Decision Theory
All the decision criteria reviewed so far rely on the concept of utility. In the axiomatic frameworks developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in [48] as well as Jaffray in [23] , utilities are derived from preferences among, respectively, probabilistic and evidential lotteries. In Savage's axiomatic system [29] , they are derived from preferences among acts. However, in practice, probabilities (or degrees of belief) and utilities are often elicited from the DM. It is then assumed that probabilities and utilities can be determined independently. Furthermore, the term "elicitation" suggests that the DM already has probabilities and utilities in the back of his mind, and that these values only need to be guessed as accurately as possible.
In [34] , Shafer questions these two assumptions. First, he argues, after Savage [29, pages 83-84] , that when assigning a utility to some consequence corresponding to some way things may turn out, we implicitly "assess probabilities for how further matters will turn out" [34, page 46] . For instance, to assessing the utility of buying a new car, I need to assess probabilities for various events such as: the possible withdrawal of my driving license, various health problems that could affect my ability to drive, etc. If we assume that predetermined utilities are waiting to be elicited, then it might not matter if utilities are, in fact, expected utilities. However, Shafer questions the existence of preexisting probabilities and utilities, and argues that these values need to be constructed. Probabilities and degrees of belief can be constructed by comparing the problem at hand with a scale of canonical examples such as randomly-coded messages [32] (see Section 3.1). For utilities, however, it might be difficult or even impossible to ensure that utilities constructed at some level of description are consistent with probabilities and utilities that would be constructed at a more detailed level of description. This is what Shafer calls "the problem of small worlds".
Formulation of a Decision Problem using Goals
Based on the arguments above, Shafer suggested that a constructive decision theory should be based not on utilities, but on goals. A goal may be defined as a "consequence" the DM decides to value and to which he attaches utility irrespective of whatever else happens [34] . The vocabulary of goals fits a constructive theory of decision because goals obviously have to be made. It avoids utility's problem of small worlds as goals constructed at a certain level of description "by conscious thought and deliberation are the clearest and most definitely structured of all our goals and motives" [34] .
As explained in Section 2.1, the standard decision-theoretic framework distinguishes between a set Ω of states of nature (or facts about the world that can determine the consequences of our acts), and a set of consequences C, which specifies how things that the DM cares about may turn out. In contrast, Shafer proposes to use a single frame of discernment Θ, defined as a set of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive descriptions of how things may turn out. A goal can then be defined as a subset of Θ. Typically, a DM formulates n goals A 1 , . . . , A n . These goals are consistent if their intersection is non-empty, and they are monotonic is the subsets are nested, i.e., if for any two goals A i and A j , we have either A i ⊆ A j or A j ⊆ A i . One can argue that goals should always be consistent, but two goals initially defined as consistent can become inconsistent after restricting the frame Θ to a subset Θ 0 as a consequence of acquiring new knowledge. However, monotonic goals A 1 , . . . , A n can never be made inconsistent after intersection the subsets A i with some subset Θ 0 .
Evaluating Acts
Assume that performing act f ensures that things will turn out according to one of the descriptions in some subset A(f ) ⊆ Θ. One of the simplest way to evaluate f is to count the number of goals it achieves,
and the number of goals it precludes,
We can then assign act f the score
This method can be extended in two directions. First, we may attach weights w 1 , . . . , w n to the goals. The total weight of the goals achieved by action f is
and the total weight of the goals precluded by f is
As before, the score of f can be defined as
The second important extension is to allow uncertainty in the relation between acts and goal satisfaction. Assume that the effect of act f is represented by a mass function m f on Θ, with focal sets F 1 , . . . , F q . The expected total weight of goals achieved by action f is then
where Bel f is the belief function associated to m f . Similarly, the expected total weight of goals precluded by action f is
Dropping the constant term n i=1 w i , the score of f can now be defined as
To see the connection with the MEU principle, we can define the utility u(θ) of any element θ of Θ as the total weight of the goals satisfied if θ holds:
Let us assume that m f is Bayesian, and let p f (θ) = m f ({θ}) for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, the quantities u + (f ) and u − (f ) become, respectively,
In that case, the quantity u + (f ) thus becomes the Bayesian expected utility, and u − (f ) is redundant. When the mass functions m f on Θ induced by each of the acts f is Bayesian, Shafer's method thus boils down to the MEU criterion, with a suitable definition of the utility function.
Example 12
As an illustration of the way Shafer's method can be applied in practice, let us consider a classification problem with a set of K classes Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω K }. Assume that we want to classify an object with unknown class Y ∈ Ω, by selecting a non-empty set C ⊆ Ω of possible classes. If Y = ω k and C = {ω k }, we have a perfectly correct classification. If ω k ∈ C but |C| > 1, then the classification is still correct, but imprecise. If ω k ∈ C, we have an error. The ways things may turn out can be described as follows. On the one hand, the object may actually belong to any of the K classes. On the other hand, we may select a set of cardinality k, k = 1, . . . , K. If the set has cardinality K, then it surely contains the true class; otherwise, we may have a correct classification or an error. The frame of discernment Θ can, thus, be defined as follows:
Our general objective is classify the object correctly while being as precise as possible. This objective can be broken down into K monotonic goals
is the goal of selecting a set of at most k elements containing the true class. Goal A K is to select a set containing the true class, whatever its the size; it can arguably be regarded as the most important, and should be assigned the largest weight. Let f C denote the act of selecting the non-empty subset C ⊆ Ω, and let m be a mass function on Ω representing evidence about the class of the object (as provided, for instance, by an evidential classifier such as described in [11] or [57] ). If |C| = k and Y = ω k , then selecting act f C will satisfy goals A k , . . . , A K iff ω k ∈ C. Consequently, the belief and plausibility of achieving each of the goals A k , . . . , A K when selecting act f C are, respectively, Bel(C) and P l(C), and the score of f C is
From (63), we can see that U (f C ) is a product of two terms, one of which increases with the size of C due to the monotonicity of mappings Bel and P l, and the other one of which decreases with the size of C. For instance, assume that K = 3, w 1 = w 2 = 1, w 3 = 2, and let m we the mass function defined as
The calculation of U (f C ) for each non-empty subset C of classes is detailed in Table 6 . We obtain the following preferences among acts:
Conclusions
I have tried in this literature review to provide a broad picture of decision methods applicable to situations where uncertainty about outcomes is formalized in the belief function framework. Interestingly, all methods boil down to MEU when the belief function is Bayesian, but they differ in several important respects in the general case.
The most important distinction between models is whether they produce a complete preference relation or a partial one. As shown by Jaffray [22] , imposing completeness of the preference relation as well as some other requirements (similar to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms [48] in the probabilistic case) leads to defining the expected utility of an evidential lottery µ as a weighted sum A⊆C µ(A)U (A), where U (A) is the aggregated utility within focal set A. The Hurwicz and OWA criteria (including the maximin, maximax and pignistic criteria as special cases) are built on this principle, the minimax regret being the only notable counterexample. Smets [37, 38, 39] was a strong advocate of the pignistic criterion, which has been widely used in applications. The main arguments put forward by Smets to support the pignistic criterion are the avoidance of Dutch books 2 under forced bets (a case for basing decisions on probability distributions, regardless on the way they are constructed) and the linearity property (27) , which uniquely determines the pignistic transformation. Smets initially proposed this requirement as an axiom, but it was not generally considered as particularly compelling. In [39] , he derived it from the MEU principle, arguing that the linearity requirement is "unavoidable provided one accepts expected utility theory". The argument, however, is complex and would need a critical re-examination. Following a different path, Jaffray [22] showed that adding a dominance axiom to complete preorder, continuity and independence axioms implies that the aggregated utility U (A) within set A should depend only on the utilities of the worst and the best consequences within that set. Accepting this axiom leads us to discarding the pignistic and OWA criteria. The most general form of decision criterion resulting from Jaffray's axioms is based on locally weighting the minimum and the maximum utility within each focal set using a "local pessimism index", generalizing the Hurwicz criterion. We thus have two methods for building a complete preference relation, supported by different axiomatic arguments: the pignistic and Jaffray criteria. Both methods depend on some design choices than need to addressed in practical applications.
Jaffray's criterion depends on r(r + 1)/2 local pessimism indices, where r is the total number of consequences. Fixing all these parameters to some constant α results in the Hurwicz criterion with only one parameter to evaluate. How to determine this parameter (or the multiple parameters in Jaffray's criterion) is an open research question. If our goal is to model the behavior or a DM, then we could adjust parameters so as to reproduce his behavior in a set of decision problems. In prediction problems, we might, alternatively, adjust the parameters to minimize some error criterion, based on the ways things actually turned out in a set of decision-making situations. Although the pignistic criterion does not seem to depend on any parameter (which may be key to its appeal in real applications), it does depend on the granularity level of the frame of discernment. Smets was aware of this difficulty and assumed that a "betting frame" had been chosen prior to decision-making. While this choice may be natural in some applications, this may not always be the case. Wilson [55] showed that, when considering all refinements of the current frame, the pignistic expectation ranges between the lower and upper expectations, just as Jaffray's criterion does. It thus seems that both criteria face critical design issues that would need to be addressed in future research.
The other main category of decision models relaxes the assumption of complete preferences and allows incomparability between some acts due to lack of information. This approach has been particularly studied in the literature on imprecise probability [45, 20] , because it is in line with the general philosophy of allowing imprecision in an agent's description of uncertainty, and propagating this uncertainty all the way up to the decision level. However, it is also relevant within the DS model. The three main criteria reported in the literature are the strong (interval) dominance, maximality and e-admissibility criteria. I have proposed a fourth criterion: weak dominance, based on a weak ordering of lowerupper expectation intervals. The weak dominance criterion lends itself to fast computation (as does strong dominance), and it has a natural interpretation in connection with the Hurwicz criterion. Maximality and e-admissibility are well justified under the imprecise-probability framework, but more work is needed to study these criteria from the pure DS perspective. One direction might be to consider the set of pignistic probabilities under all refinements, which Wilson [55] showed to be a strict subset of the set of all compatible probabilities. Could we define decision criteria based on that set, and would they be similar to, or different from the criteria derived in the imprecise-probability framework? These are interesting questions that should be addressed in further research.
Finally, Shafer's constructive decision theory, as exposed in a paper written in December 1982 [35] but only published in 2016 [34] , departs fundamentally to other approaches and constitutes a category of its own. Shafer questions the practical relevance of the concept of utility, which, he argues, are not pre-existing and waiting to be elicited, but need to be constructed. He proposes to shift the focus from utilities to goals, formalized as subsets of a frame of discernment comprising both states of nature and "states of the person", i.e., consequences of acts. Shafer proposed to score each act by the number of goals they ensure minus the number of goals they preclude. We note that a partial preference relation could also be constructed by considering an act f 1 to be at least as desirable as an act f 2 if f 1 ensures at least as many goals while precluding at most as many goals. As Shafer's decision theory has been overlooked until recently, deeper investigations remain to be carried out to fully understand its theoretical and practical implications, and to put it in perspective with respect to other approaches.
From this overview of methods of decision-making with belief functions, it is clear that a lot of issues related to decision-making with belief functions remain unsolved and open to investigation. As argued by Bell, Raiffa and Tversky [3] (cited in [34] ), decision models can be evaluated descriptively by their empirical validity, normatively by their theoretical adequacy, or prescriptively by their pragmatic value, i.e., by their ability to help people make better decisions. Very little is known about the value of DS theory as a descriptive model of human reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty, and considerably more work is needed to compare the normative and prescriptive values of the various decision methods reviewed in this paper.
